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Abstract. There are many types of concern to project management, and we used to deal with
them by using Risk management activities. But in complicated situations, there are many factors
and preconditions of the issues that make the problems unrecognizable with risk consultants, and
the consequences of these issues getting more and more enormous. The cause of the problems can
be a conflict between the project teams and their partners or maybe inside their team, or between
groups. The solution for these unseen conflicts can result in cost, schedule, and quality of the project.
In recent study trends, the application of Game theory to conflict resolution in project management
began to be applied. In this research, we propose a Unified model of Game theory to solve the
conflict problems in project management. We present solution of using the Unified model for three
typical conflict problems: project payments, multi-round procurement, and management of risk re-
sponses. Experimental results show that the proposed model has been applied effectively for these
three problems.
Keywords. Project Conflicts; Game Theory; Nash Equilibrium.
1. INTRODUCTION
Project management is the core process of most current business activities, which include
the projects that have the goal of creating products, services or original results. Project
management tasks include project scope management, quality, project schedule, budget, re-
sources, and risks. In which Risk management examines the functions which would happen
including plan scheduling processes, risk identification, analyzing, resource planning and pro-
ject control monitoring. Risk management aims for increasing the probability and influences
of positive events, also decreasing the likelihood and consequences of adverse events of the
project, in which risks determined as uncertain events or conditions which when occurs,
would affect the project [1]. Still, there are more internal problems affecting the project
which is out of the management of Risk management parts such as the conflicts between
the project partners or the conflicts in Risk management itself. Therefore, detecting and
analyzing these problems brings a necessary supplement for the Project management tasks,
thus ensuring all matters arising to be controlled and also enhancing the quality and chances
of success of the project.
Of all the problem-solving methods involving the conflict of interests type, Game theory
emerges as a highly potential approach, whereas many of the Game theory applications
have achieved remarkable scientific achievements such as the Nobel Prize. Game theory is a
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branch of applied mathematics that studies tactical situations in which players choose diffe-
rent actions to try to maximize the results received. Therefore, the outcome will depend on
the decision of all players, in which each player will try to predict the choice of the remaining
players to be able to make the best choice for themselves [2]. Nash Equilibrium is one of
the most commonly used concepts in the applications of Game theory in economics when it
comes to studying interdependent behaviors of agents with mutually contradictory goals. It
is the central concept of non-cooperative Game theory with perfect information, proposed
by J.F. Nash (1951). Thus, the objectives of this study include:
(i) Analysis of existing conflicts and conflicts within the project that are beyond the scope
of the risk and not adequately managed;
(ii) The research will investigate some of the existing models regarding some problems that
have resulted in the publication;
(iii) And finally, to synthesize and propose a Unified model for conflict problems in the
project according to Game theory and also suggest a Nash Equilibrium model for this
problem.
The results of the current research on the type of conflicts in the project under the direction
of Game theory are not much. It may include the previous studies of Brent Lagesse [3] on
the model of Game theory’s delivery of the project in which to consider the conflicts when
assigning personnel but does not have the appropriate skills for the job. It also includes
the problem of conflict in schedule payments [4] in addition to some author’s claims on the
subject matter such as improved articles and algorithmic modifications and the model of
multi-round procurement [5], or issues when implementing payment scheduling [6]. It is
clear that the problems of the project are numerous and complex, with many variations, and
moreover the results are needed for the management of the project so much that further
similar researches on other issue are required, particularly a joint study on the overview of
all existing conflicts, as well as build a general unified model. Based on conventional models
of Game theory, we can apply a variety of solutions, namely multi-objective optimization
strategies or evolutionary algorithms to find a Nash Equilibrium. In this solution, players
composed of members and organizations inside and outside the project are satisfied or have
a balanced benefit, no one is worse, and no one is more profitable than the many criteria
of the problem. Given the different layers of the project, the solution to Nash Equilibrium
is very relevant and necessary. The rest of this paper is organizing as follows. Section 2
presents a classification of conflicts in project management; In Section 3 we show the game-
theoretical model of conflicts and present status of applying Game theory to three typical
conflict problems: Project Payments, Multi-round Procurement, and Management of Risk
responses. Section 4 presents applying the unified model for the three mentioned problems.
We conduct the experimental evaluation in Section 5. Section 6 concludes with a summary
and shows our future work.
2. CLASSIFICATION OF CONFLICTS IN PROJECT MANAGEMENT
Based on various factors such as the source, cause, role or function of conflicts in the
project, conflicts can be classified into several categories as follows [7, 8]:
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• By source of conflict, conflicts are classified as (i) conflict from plan scheduling, (ii)
conflict from determining the priority in performing project task, (iii) conflict from the
power sources, (iv) conflict from technical problems, (v) conflict from administrative
procedure, (vi) conflict from private issue and (vii) conflict from expenditure.
• By cause of conflict, conflicts are classified as: (i) conflict from different goals, (ii)
conflict from resource disparity, (iii) conflict by other people’s obstruction, (iv) conflict
due to stress and psychological pressure from many people, (v) conflict due to ambiguity
of jurisdiction and (vi) conflict due to misleading communication.
• By role, conflicts are classified as (i) positive conflict and (ii) negative conflict.
• By function, conflicts are classified as (i) functional conflict and (ii) dysfunctional
conflict.
In the conflict classification system, research would choose to determine and list the conflict
by origin [8] such as the Table 1.
3. GAME-THEORETICAL MODEL OF CONFLICTS
Game theory is a methodology using mathematical tools to model and analyze situations
involving several decision makers (DMs), called players [2]. Game theoretic models arise in
numerous application domains including Board and field games, Marketing and commercial
operations, Politics, Defense, Robotics and multi-agent systems, Social networks [2, 9].
3.1. Game representation
The strategic form of a game
Strategic form of a game with finite n players is a tuple of three parts as follows [9]
G =
〈
N,
(
Ai
)
i∈N ,
(
ui
)
i∈N
〉
(1)
where,
G is the game in strategic form;
N =
{
1, 2, .., n
}
is the set of players;
Ai is the set of action of player i (i ∈ N);
A :=
{
a|a = (ai)i∈N , ai ∈ Ai,∀i ∈ N
}
is the set of action profiles;
ui : A→ R is the payoff function of player i: (a1, a2, ..., an)→ ui(a1, a2, ..., an).
The payoff function ui is a profit (to maximize) but can also be a cost (to minimize).
An equivalent way of writing the action profiles is (aj)j∈N = (a1, a2, ..., an) = (ai, a−i), where
a−i = (aj)j∈N,j 6=i is the action profile of all players except i.
Nash Equilibrium
The basic concept of the Nash Equilibrium is “unilateral deviations”: Only one player
changes its own decision while the others stick to their current choices. The action pro-
file/outcome a∗ = (a∗1, .., a∗i , .., a
∗
n) is Nash Equilibrium (NE) when
ui(a
∗
i , a
∗
−i) ≥ ui(ai, a∗−i), ∀ai ∈ Ai, ∀i ∈ N, (2)
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Table 1. Classification by source of conflicts
Source Conflict description
Plan scheduling
Conflict between the project scheduling conditions
Conflict in project payment schedule
Conflict between the plan and other project management activities
such as: expense, time, human resources and power sources
Conflict between the changes of plans
Determining
priority in
performing
project task
Conflict in assigning roles for performing the task
Conflict between the binding factors of the project task
Not defining the priority level of each task
Conflict between the priority levels when implementing risk manage-
ment methods
Power sources
Conflict in assigning roles for project implementation and capability
Conflict in attributing project power sources
Conflict in multi-round procurement
Conflict in procurement
Technical
problems
Conflict between communicating channels
Conflict between technology complexity and project completion de-
adline
Conflict between staff capability and project technology
Conflict between technology and educating process
Administrative
procedure
Conflict between project management methods
Conflict between the tasks of the project implementation units
Conflict between the project implementation procedures and project
implementing speed
Conflict between applying standards of the project
Private issue
Conflict between the goal of the investors
Conflict between the board of managers and the project implemen-
tation members
Conflict between the project members
Conflict between project experience and member payment expense
Expenditure
Conflict in attributing project expenses
Conflict in finance management and project changes
Conflict between financial management and project quality
Conflict between finance management and educating human resources
of the project
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NE is the point where no player can get a higher profit by his unilateral tactics. That is, a
player who wants to maximize their benefits will not deviate from the NE. In fact, a non-NE
strategy means that there is a player who can get higher returns by choosing a strategy a
′′
when others choose the strategy a
′
that ui
(
a
′′
i , a
′
−i
) ≥ ui(a′i, a′−i).
However, the current model with the class of conflicting problems in project management
has the following issues: In a game of conflict which affect to owner benefit, the interests
of the owner and the partners also have the opposite; the investor is also the person who
keeps the game fair to players who are counterparts. For games without the participation
of the owner, all players are equal in the game, there should be one more person play an
essential role in balancing the interests of the players. On the other hand, to evaluate a
particular players specific tactics is good or not, it must be based on the factors affecting the
gain considered in the problem. For example, these factors in the risk problem are: severity,
priority, cost of risk, duration of implementation, difficulty of the method; and these in the
Multi-objective procurement problem are: the confidence of the contractor with the project
owner, the prestige of the contractor, the time of implementation, the price of the tender
package. Therefore, each strategy characterized by a set represented by the influencing
factors.
3.2. Applying Game theory to some typical conflict problems in project mana-
gement - present status
According to the classification of conflict problems in project management as discussed
above in Section 2, objects in conflict can be model as players in a game; however, there are
two main issues as follows:
• The way to explain the model, describe the game, describe the strategy and determine
the Nash Equilibrium are different in each research.
• In some classes of games in which no player is the owner, it is unreasonable to consider
the balance of interests among players without regard to the general interest of the
project (project owner).
Typical representatives of these problems may be listed: conflict in project payments, conflict
in multi-round procurement, conflict in the management of risk processing solutions [2, 8]:
Conflict in project payments
Scheduling project payments are one of the problems that have caught much attention
in project management [4]. In managing the project, it is always necessary to unify the
owner’s payment and the contractor’s schedule so that both parties benefit. While the
investor wants to delay paying the project, the contractor expects the amount to take place
as soon as possible. The involvement of the investor and the contractor is a game of two
players in which each party wants to achieve their interests. The payment plan is divided
into payment periods with different amounts of money by the investor. The contractor runs
the project through several stages with various activities, which have certain constraints.
Each activity has several ways of proceeding, each of which consumes a specified amount of
resources over a specified period. Conflicts occur in the payment of project funds when both
contractor and investor want to maximize their financial returns. The optimal payment
schedule with the contractor is to obtain a one-time payment at the start of the project.
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After receiving the total initial amount, the contractor will try to minimize their costs
by scheduling work such that higher cash flow. The optimal payment schedule for both
contractor and investor is called the ideal solution for both, having a payment schedule that
corresponds to the completed work of the project [4]. The main problem is solving the
schedule of the project, ensuring both the interests of the investor and the contractor during
the project implementation which helps to resolve the conflict between the contractor and
the project owner during the project payment process based on information from both of
them.
In [4] there assumed that the terms of project payment in the contract are executed in
stages, namely, the project payment is making at a node of an activity network. The ideal
protocol for the owner must be that the money is paid once for all only when the project
is completing. It is evident that in most cases, any single profitable scheme is hard to be
accepted by both sides and compromise has to be considered [4]. A more practical situation
is that during the process of this compromise (or gaming), the owner puts forward a schedule
of payment first, and then the client proposes a corresponding activity schedule according
to that payment schedule. The strategic game is presented as follows [4]:
G =
{
S0, S0 → Sc, u0(S0, Sc), uc(S0, Sc)
}
, (3)
where,
S0: the strategy of the project owner;
Sc: the strategy of the project team;
u0(S0, Sc): payoff function of the owner;
uc(S0, Sc): payoff function of the contractor.
The difference in formula (3) and formula (1) is the role of S0 - project owner.
Conflict in multi-round procurement
Multi-round procurement with many bidders is the process of the project owner, and
other bidders join negotiation, persuasion to bring benefits to themselves [5]. Bidding is a
process whereby an investor chooses a contractor who meets his or her requirements. The
buyer organizes the tender so that the seller (the contractor) can compete for each other.
Indeed, for large projects, time stretching is usually divided into smaller categories. The
project owner (investor) will not find the contractor for the whole project at a single time
but will hold the bid for each item at different times. The purpose is to maximize the benefits
to the contractor while minimizing risks during project implementation. The contractor will
select the time of bidding and choose the significant level of the tender package. Since the
raw material prices fluctuate over time, the contractor must ensure that they have sufficient
capacity to implement the tender package. The investor will choose to distribute the parts
of the package to the appropriate contractor [2, 5].
Conflict occurs when both builders and contractors participating in the bidding will try
to get the most significant benefit for themselves from the tender package. Specifically, for
the contractors, the benefit that they wish to receive from the tender package is to find a
reliable investor with the most reasonable price to reduce the cost of the project, minimize
the cost of the project but it does not offend their partners. For the investors, the critical goal
is to be selected. To achieve that they should provide the most suitable conditions and prices
for the offered goods; their last benefit is the profit from the project after winning the bid.
The problem is to solve the Multi-round procurement problem, ensure the benefits for both
NASH EQUILIBRIUM MODEL FOR CONFLICTS IN PROJECT MANAGEMENT 173
the contractor and the investor, that is, help to resolve conflicts between the contractor and
the project owner during the Multi-round procurement engagement based on the available
information of the project, the project owner and the contractor. In practical situations, the
process of this compromise is significantly difficult and depends mainly on project investor [5].
Solving the problem of multi-round procurement brings the win-win result for all parties.
The strategic game is presented as following [5]:
G =
{
S0, Sc, F0, Fc
}
, (4)
where,
S0: the strategy of contractor;
Sc: the strategy of the bidder;
F0: payoff function of the contractor;
Fc: payoff function of the bidder.
The game presentations of both problems, Project payments, and Multi-round procure-
ment are similar (see (3) and (4)).
Conflict in the management of risk processing solutions
Risk factors always exist in all activities of project implementation. However, identifying
and control the risks in the project are not simple. Many projects have overlooked or
controlled a risky, prone to failure, customer complaints about quality or loss of capital due
to rising costs. Risk management in projects will increase the positive impact and mitigate
negative consequences from the risks. Risks will be identified, analyzed, monitored and to
minimize the risks arising before, during and after project implementation [8, 10].
When planning to address risk, this may occur in conflict with another risk handling plan.
Therefore, the choice of how to deal with risks will directly affect the progress and benefits
of the project [10]. The strategic game for conflicts in the management of risk processing
solutions is as following [10]
G =
{
R0 → Rn;Sij(tij , pij , cij , dij); C0 → Cm; pi(Cx → Cy)
}
, (5)
where,
R0 → Rn : denotes all the risks that a conflict may have while being resolved;
n: number of risks;
Sij(tij , pij , cij , dij) : denotes the method of handling j for risk Ri;
tij : denotes the time to implement method j for risk Ri;
pij : denotes the priority of implementing method j for risk Ri;
cij : denotes the cost when implementing method j for risk Ri;
dij : denotes the difficulty of method j for the risk Ri;
C0 → Cm: denotes conflicting groups of handling between risks;
m: denotes the number of conflicts in the risk management plan;
pi(Cx → Cy): is payoff matrix for groups of risk Cx → Cy in conflict.
3.3. Proposed solution for a Unified model of Game theory for conflict problems
The idea of the Unified model is to create a special player with different interests than
the rest of the players. For games involving the investor, this particular player is called the
investor. For non-investor games, this special player is acquired by adding a virtual player
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called a referee in the game. At the same time, each player’s specific tactics will also have a
characteristic vector that indicates the extent to which elements of the strategy are affected.
In the Unified model, this player is represented with
{
P0, S0, u0
}
, where P0 is special player(
investor in games with the participation of investors, virtual player in the game without
the involvement of investors
)
; S0 is the set of pure strategies of a special player, and u0 is a
payoff function of the special player P0.
Other N normal players will be modeled as
{
P , Si, ui
}
, where P is a set of N normal
players (partners) joining the game; Si is a set of pure strategies of the players number i. ui
is a payoff function of the normal player number i.
We propose adding component Rc, which presents set of players conflicts.
Thus, by combining three components: (i) special player, (ii) regular/normal players and
(iii) set of players conflicts, we propose unified model as follows
G =
{
P0, S0, u0, P, Si, ui, R
c
}
, (6)
where,
G : represents the game;
P0 is a special player who is a stakeholder of project or a virtual player who represent
the benefit of entire project when we analyze the characteristics of project elements;
S0 =
{
s01, .., s0j , .., s0M0
}
is the set of strategies of the special player; M0 is the number
of strategies of the special player;
u0 : S0 → R is a payoff function that maps special player’s strategy to payoff value in a
real number;
P =
{
P1, .., Pi, .., PN
}
is a set of normal players; N : number of normal players;
Si =
{
si1, ..sij , ..siMi
}
is a set of strategies of normal player i(1 ≤ i ≤ N) and Mi is the
number of strategy of normal player i;
ui : Si → R is a payoff function that maps the strategy of player i to payoff value in a
real number (1 ≤ i ≤ N);
Rc: is vector space denotes a set of conflicts in the problem, and the non-empty vector
~v ∈ Rc denotes a conflict between strategies of M players (1 ≤M ≤ N), in a strategic form
Game, ~v ∈ Rc can be explained in detail as follows (s0k, spq, .., sxy), in which s0k ∈ S0 and
spq, sxy ∈ Si, (1 ≤ p, x ≤ N) and (1 ≤ q ≤Mp)(1 ≤ y ≤Mx);
Nash Equilibrium is determined as follows:
When a player i, (1 ≤ i ≤ N) chooses a pure strategy si ∈ Si, Si =
{
si1, .., sij , ..., siMi
}
and s−i ∈ Si is the pure strategy of other players except i (1 ≤ i ≤ N) and s−i ⊃
S0 =
{
s01, .., s0i, .., s0N
}
. The payoff function of player i can also be described in the
form ui(si, s−i). The set of strategies s∗ = (s∗1, .., s∗i , .., s
∗
n) is Nash Equilibrium when
∀(s∗i , s∗j ) /∈ Rc, (1 ≤ i, j ≤ N) and
ui
(
s∗i , s
∗
−i
) ≥ ui(si, s∗−i), ∀si ∈ Si, ∀i ∈ N. (7)
NE is the point where no player can get a higher profit by his unilateral tactics. That is
a player who wants to maximize their benefits will not deviate from the NE. A non-NE
strategy means that there is a player who can get higher returns by choosing a strategy s
′′
when others want the strategy s
′
that ui
(
s
′′
i , s
′
−i
) ≥ ui(s′i, s′−i).
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4. USING UNIFIED MODEL FOR SOLVING CONFLICT PROBLEMS IN
PROJECT MANAGEMENT
4.1. Project payments
The problem of optimizing the conflict in all billing project can be modeled into a game
consisting of two persons (the investor and the contractor) with the adequate information
represented by the Unified model from the (6)
G =
{
P0, S0, u0, P1, S1, u1, R
c
}
, (8)
where,
P0 is a project owner;
S0 =
{
s01, .., s0j , .., s0N
}
is a set of the project owners strategies; N is number of activity
in a project;
u0 : S0 → R is a payoff function that maps project owner’s strategy to payoff value in a
real number;
P1 is a contractor;
S1 =
{
s11, .., s1j , .., s1N
}
is a set of the contractors strategies;
u1 : S1 → R is a payoff function that maps contractor’s strategy to payoff value in a real
number;
Rc is vector space denotes a set of conflicts in payment order, and the non-empty vector
~v ∈ Rc denotes a conflict between desired payment order of 2 players (project owner and
contractor), in a strategic form, it represents a conflict between 2 strategy (s0i, s1j), in which
s0i ∈ S0 and s1j ∈ S1 and (1 ≤ i, j ≤ N);
To set up a project schedule, the investor’s strategy S0 =
{
s01, .., s0j , .., s0N
}
is the list
of the payments, each s0j of which is represented as follows s0j = (pay1, .., payj , .., payM ).
In the above expression, payj(1 ≤ j ≤M) is the percentage of the budget that the investor
intended to pay to the contractor at the event i, and M is the total period of payment for
the project. The list of payments needs to meet the following constraint:
M∑
i=1
payi = 1. (9)
In the set of the contractors strategies S1 =
{
s11, .., s1j , .., s1N
}
, the strategy named s1j
represented by the vector ~w which has the H dimension ~w =
{
s1j1, .., s1jk, .., s1jH
}
denotes H
kinds of resources (human resource, facilities, environment, etc.) which the project activity
j needs to complete the task.
4.2. Multi-round procurement
The problem of optimizing the conflict in the multi-round procurement problem can be
modeled by a game having 1 + N players, which consists of one investor and N remaining
players are contractors with full information represented by the strategic set as follows [5]
G =
{
P0, S0, u0, P, Si, ui, R
c
}
, (10)
where,
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P0 is a project owner;
S0 =
{
s01,.., s0j ,.., s0K
}
is a set of the project owners strategies; K is a number of project
owner’s strategies;
u0 : S0 → R is a payoff function that maps project owner’s strategy to payoff value in a
real number;
P =
{
P1, ..Pi, ..PN
}
is a set of contractors;
Si =
{
Si1, ..Sij , ..SiMi
}
is a set of strategies of contractor number i(1 ≤ i ≤ N) and Mi
is the number of strategy of player i and can be also known as number of category player i
want to submit;
ui : Si → R is a payoff function that maps the strategy of player i to payoff value in a
real number (1 ≤ i ≤ N);
Rc: is vector space denotes a set of conflicts in the problem, and the non-empty vector ~v ∈
Rc denotes a conflict between strategies of M contractors who submit in a same procurement
packaging
{
Pi1, ..Pij , ..PiM
}
, (1 ≤ M ≤ N). In a strategic form, ~v ∈ Rc can be explained
in detail as follows (s0k, si1, .., sij , .., siB), in which s0k ∈ S0 and (si1, .., sij , .., siB) ∈ Si,
(1 ≤ i, j ≤ N) and (1 ≤ B ≤MB);
To solve the bidding for the entire project which has Q types of material to be purchased
in K categories, the project owner must define a procurement requirements for each category,
the strategic set of the investor S0 =
{
s01, .., s0j , .., s0K
}
is the scheduling of procurement
requirement and the time-line for each key milestone, which each s0j corresponds to procu-
rement requirement of category j, on which includes the name, quantity and cost of items of
the category j. And s0j can be described in detail as follows:
(
matej1, ..,mateji, ..,matejK
)
and K is the number of items in category j. In the above expression, mateji contains a
tuple of three elements (nameofitem, quantity, cost) of items j which the project owner is
going to buys. In the set of the contractor’s strategies Si =
{
si1, .., sij , .., siMi
}
, the element
sij denotes a decision and procurement bidding plan for category j over Mi categories of
contractor i, it can be explained in detail by: sij =
{
sij1, .., ssijk, .., sijH
}
, H is number of
items in the category j, and sijk is a bidding information for the item k of category j.
4.3. Risk responses
We add virtual player P0, which plays the role of referee in the game to keep the balance
between normal players (the risk). The game includes other N risks (players) which conflict
with each other. Both two kind of player has a single goal to find the best solution for the
game which can protect the players from conflicts with another one. Based on the unified
model (formula (6)), the problem of conflict optimization in the risk conflicting problem can
be modeled into a game, consisting of N conflicting risk and one virtual player as follows
G =
{
P0, S0, u0, P, Si, ui, R
c
}
, (11)
where,
P0 is a virtual player who represent the benefit of entire project;
S0 =
{
s01, .., s0j , .., s0M0
}
is the set of strategies of the special player; M0 is the number
of strategies of the special player;
u0 : S0 → R is a payoff function that maps special player’s strategy to payoff value in a
real number;
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P =
{
P1, .., Pi, .., PN
}
is a set of all risks which have the conflicts in response methods;
N : number of risks which have a conflict to each other;
Si =
{
si1, ..sij , ..siMi
}
is a set of response of risk i(1 ≤ i ≤ N) and Mi is the number of
response for risk i;
ui : Si → R is a payoff function that maps the effectiveness in selecting Si for risk i to
payoff value in a real number (1 ≤ i ≤ N);
Rc: is vector space denotes a set of conflicts in the problem, and the non-empty vector
~v ∈ Rc denotes a conflict between response methods of M risks. This group of risks can
be defined as
{
Pi1, ..Pij , .., PiB
}
, (1 ≤ B ≤ N). In a strategic form, ~v ∈ Rc can be explain
in detail as follows (s0k, si1, .., sij , .., siB), in which s0k ∈ S0 and (si1, .., sij , .., siB) ∈ Si,
(1 ≤ i, j ≤ N) and (1 ≤ B ≤MB);
The strategy for risk j of the virtual player is the tuple of four elements: minimal cost,
minimal time that project owner plan for risk j, maximal cost, maximal time that project
owner can afford
S0j =
{
costjmin, costjmax, timejmin, timejmax
}
. (12)
Set of risks P =
{
P1, .., Pi, .., PN
}
with each Pi is characterized by the performance vector
~w with the elements: (i) the amount of money that must be incurred in the event of the
impact (impact) and (ii) the level of risk (level). In detail ~w =
(
wimpact, wlevel
)
.
The payoff value of the project owner will be
u0 = a1wimpact + a2wlevel = a1
N∑
i=1
wimpacti .e
−rti + a2
N∑
i=1
wleveli (13)
where a1, a2 are the expert setting value to balance the importance of two factors impact,
level. e−rti often to be use in defining the real value of money with interest rate r in t time.
Set of strategies to solve all the risk Si =
{
Si1, .., Sij , .., SiMi
}
with each Sij is characte-
rized by the performance vector ~u =
(
ucost, upriority, udiff , utime
)
indicates the influence of
four factors in selecting right response method for risk i, (1 ≤ i ≤ N). These four factors
are: (i) cost, (ii) priority, (iii) difficulty (diff), and (iv) time.
The payoff value of risk i in case of selecting the response method k is the combination
of these four risk response’s characteristics: (i) cost, (ii) priority, (iii) difficult, and (iv) time.
In detail, the payoff function of the risk i will be
ui = b1ucost + b2upriority + b3udiff + b4utime
= b1
wimpacti − ucosti
(1 + r)ti
+ b2upriorityi + b3udiffi + b4utimei .
(14)
The smaller the ui function, the greater the benefit for the risks (normal players).
5. EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS
5.1. Project payments
A software project includes 20 tasks, each task needs a specific amount of time to finish,
and it requires one or two type of resource. The quantity of each resource and working time
will define the cost of performing this task. The cost per unit for Resource 1 is 1 million,
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and the cost per unit for Resource 2 is 2 million dollars. The monthly discount rate for both
the owner and the client is estimated to be 0.7%. By computer-based calculation, we obtain
optimal results in a Nash Equilibrium pattern for both investors and developers and results
are given in Table 2.
Table 2. Project tasks and efforts
Activity Time Resource
1
Resource
2
Activity Time Resource
1
Resource
2
1 10 6 2 11 80 2 2
2 30 6 1 12 30 3 0
3 50 3 0 13 30 3 0
4 50 3 0 14 50 3 2
5 10 3 1 15 150 3 2
6 60 6 2 16 50 3 2
7 60 6 2 17 40 0 1
8 50 3 1 18 110 4 1
9 40 6 0 19 90 6 2
10 90 3 2 20 50 5 1
With both the payment schedule and activities schedule are optimal, both parties of the
game meet at the equilibrium. The amount of money to pay by the investors is 82.27 million
dollars. It is saving 1.26 million dollars compared to 83.52 million dollars of the first plan and
3.07 million dollars compared to 85.33 of the second plan, whereas with the developers, their
net profit is 43.12 million dollars, more than 12.01 million dollars compared to 31.11 million
dollars of the first plan and 7.81 million dollars compared to 35.31 million dollars of the
second plan. We want to emphasize that the area of Game theory and project management
has a successful established practical model that can cover more issues than those treated in
this introduction. The Nash Equilibrium has resolved the conflict of the payment schedule
found in the application.
5.2. Multi-round procurement
Using the above model and put it into the input of the genetic algorithm in the problem
Multi-round procurement, the data of the problem include information about the bidding
packages, the strategies of 3 contractors [5]. The Multi-round procurement problem belongs
to the participant class, so there is no need to simulate a virtual player. After running in
program ten times, a table of result has been produced to compare fitness function values,
investors and contractor benefits. Through experiments on simulation data set, it was found
out some points:
• The results after the runs are not identical, but are fairly similar and adaptive functions
have approximate values. The average standard deviation of investor is only 10.259%.
With a better computer and longer running time, we will have a smaller deviation.
• The wide range of fitness value (investor: 657,093 - 971,988 and bidder: 106,279 -
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Table 3. Schedule 1
Node Activity Payment (%)
1 1, 2 15
2 3 15
3 4 15
4 5, 6 5
5 7, 8 3
6 9, 10, 11, 12 5
7 13, 14 5
8 15, 16, 17, 18, 19 10
9 20 27
Table 4. Schedule 2
Node Activity Payment (%)
1 1, 2 25
2 3, 4, 5 5
3 6, 7 5
4 8, 9 15
5 10, 11, 12 10
6 13, 14, 15 10
7 16, 17 15
8 18 5
9 19, 20 10
Table 5. Information about the bidding package
Round Stage Product ID Product name Quantity
1 ST01 H01 PC 100
H02 Laptop 25
2 ST02 H03 Projector 50
3 ST03 H04 Printer 25
H05 Color Printer 2
H06 Scanner 10
4 ST04 H01 PC 12
H02 Laptop 2
5 ST05 H04 Printer 26
H05 Color Printer 1
H06 Scanner 22
6 ST06 H01 PC 21
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Table 6. Strategies of contractor 1
Product ID Starting
point
Ending point Original price Sale price Discount
H01 1/6/2016 31/5/2017 10,720 12,800 10
H02 1/6/2016 31/5/2017 14,800 17,400 10
H03 1/6/2016 31/5/2017 3,500 4,150 10
H04 1/6/2016 31/5/2017 11,400 13,350 10
H05 1/6/2016 31/5/2017 2,880 3,400 10
H06 1/6/2016 31/5/2017 31,050 36,900 10
H01 1/6/2017 31/12/2018 11,680 13,760 8
H02 1/6/2017 31/12/2018 13,600 16,200 8
H03 1/6/2017 31/12/2018 3,750 4,400 8
H04 1/6/2017 31/12/2018 10,650 12,600 8
H05 1/6/2017 31/12/2018 3,080 3,600 8
H06 1/6/2017 31/12/2018 31,500 37,350 8
106,279) shows us that all generations have a good candidate with a variety of charac-
teristic.
• Looking at the value of profitability of each contractor, contractors benefits are balan-
ced, to show us that an optimal solution meets Nash Equilibrium criterion.
Table 7. Testing result
Product
ID
Starting
point
Investor (1000VND) Benefit of contractor (1000VND)
Estimated
cost
Payment Benefit Bidder 1 Bidder 2 Bidder
3
10:01.5 3,570,381 5,386,000 3,896,428 767,244 133,715 132,481 135,468
11:47.4 3,879,695 5,386,000 3,792,720 870,952 108,000 106,766 106,279
08:18.8 2,363,866 5,386,000 4,006,579 657,093 137,443 136,209 138,599
09:41.4 4,299,435 5,386,000 3,874,651 789,020 135,191 133,957 133,093
08:11.6 2,920,003 5,386,000 3,881,353 782,318 134,814 133,580 133,517
09:45.6 2,133,330 5,386,000 3,883,464 780,208 134,641 133,407 134,290
25:14.1 2,120,500 5,386,000 3,898,911 764,761 135,080 133,846 134,642
24:14.9 4,183,533 5,386,000 3,890,816 772,855 135,565 134,331 133,499
08:18.8 2,363,866 5,386,000 3,691,684 971,988 125,952 124,718 125,753
09:41.4 4,299,435 5,386,000 3,874,651 789,020 135,191 133,957 133,093
At this time, we can say that we successfully find a balanced point Nash Equilibrium
for a game of bidders and investor. The paper has proposed a useful method in solving the
problem of multi-round procurement which needs the right decision-making in each round of
bidding. It also proved the potentiality when applying Game-theoretical model in real-world
procurement projects.
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5.3. Risk responses
In solving risk management problem, we must find a set of risk management characteris-
tics in the project. These options will help us to define the value of the response of risks based
on the matrix of Game theory. In 25 response methods o 7 risks; there are response methods
of one risk does not get along with another, these clash of risk responses are described in the
following tables [10]
Table 8. Risks - players of the game
Risk ID Financial impact Risk level
R01 20,000 Extreme
R02 10,000 High
R03 400,000 Extreme
R04 30,000 High
R05 6,000 Medium
R06 12,000 Medium
R07 34000 Low
Table 9. Conflict between risk responses
Conflict ID Risk responses 1 Risk responses 2
Con01 S11 S24
Con02 S15 S33
Con03 S41 S53
Con04 S61 S72
After five times of experiments running, a table of result has been produced to compare
fitness function values, investors and contractor benefits (See Table 11). Through experi-
ments on simulation data set, it was found out some points:
• The fitness functions after 100 generations are almost the same; The average value of
Fitness function is 13,732. The average of the absolute deviations is only 3.33%. An
applying Genetic Algorithm to this problem showed positive results.
• The running time is a little bit low because of this paper apply traditional Genetic
Algorithm. The running time can be decreased if we implement a better approach in
Genetic Algorithms such as NSGA II or NSGA III.
• In the sample data, the quantity of risk, and risk responses are small, so that the Nash
Equilibrium found look similar, but it will be more diversified in more significant data
set.
This experiment presents that we successfully explored a new optimization method by mo-
deling the problem with Game theory and finding a Nash Equilibrium of the game by a
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Table 10. Risk responses - strategies of players
Risk response Cost($) Difficulty Time Priority
S11 30,000 7 23 9
S12 356,000 4 38 1
S13 11,000 8 42 7
S14 184,000 2 34 5
S15 4,000 8 29 8
S21 2,000 9 9 2
S22 49,000 6 30 3
S23 7,000 3 51 6
S24 5,000 3 33 3
S25 1,000 9 58 4
S31 4,000 6 26 4
S32 8,000 2 23 9
S33 23,000 4 20 7
S34 37,000 5 20 8
S35 19,000 5 21 8
S41 18,000 2 48 2
S42 25,000 1 60 0
S43 2,000 6 25 5
S51 22,000 2 17 7
S52 5,000 3 33 4
S53 1,000 6 13 8
S61 108,000 0 40 8
S62 6,000 6 44 8
S71 123,000 3 37 8
S72 8,000 9 30 9
Table 11. Nash Equilibrium of the Game
No Time Fitness value Nash Equilibria - Recommended risk responses
1 11:21.5 13,375 5, 4, 1, 2, 3, 2, 2
2 10:47.4 14,101 4, 4, 2, 2, 3, 1, 2
3 09:58.9 13,986 2, 1, 5, 3, 1, 1, 2
4 09:41.4 12,945 2, 4, 2, 1, 2, 1, 1
5 10:11.6 14,253 4, 1, 5, 3, 3, 2, 1
Multi-objectives optimization algorithm. We believe that the general model for all con-
flicts introduced in formula (6) will help in finding a solution for the complex issue of risk
responses.
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6. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we proposed an efficient approach for solving three typical conflict problems
in project management: project payments, multi-round procurement, and conflicts in risk
responses. Firstly, we develop a unified model of Game theory for conflict problems, which
contains three components: an individual player, N regular players and a set of conflicts.
Then, we propose the approach to apply the Nash Equilibrium for the model based on
calculation the payoff function ui(si, s−i) and the set of risk conflicts Rc.
Finally, we apply a Unified model using Nash Equilibrium method to solve three pro-
blems. We detail the application of the Unified model of Game theory and construct the Nash
Equilibrium for each of the above problems. Experimental results show that our approach
works effectively.
In the future, we will focus on how to apply multi-objective optimization algorithms
in finding the Nash Equilibrium for multi-round procurement and risk responses conflicts
problems..
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
This research was supported by Vietnams National Foundation for Science and Techno-
logy Development (NAFOSTED), funded by the Ministry of Science and Technology (Project
Code 102.03-2019.10).
REFERENCES
[1] Project management Institue, Newtown Square, Pennsylvania 19073-3299, USA, A Guide to
the Project management Body of Knowledge (PMBOK@ Guide), Fourth edition, ISBN: 978-
1-933890-51-7, 2008. Available: https://www.academia.edu/37884999/Guide_to_Project_
Management_Book_of_Knowledge_4th_edition [Accessed: 22 - May - 2019]
[2] John von Neumann, Oskar Morgenstern, Theory of Games and Economic Behavior. Princeton
University Press, ISBN: 0691130612, 2007.
[3] Brent Lagesse, “A Game-theoretical model for task assignment in project management,” Procee-
ding of the IEEE International Conference on Management of Innovation and Technology,
Singapore, China, Singapore, June 21–23, 2006 (pp.678-680).
[4] Deng Ze-min, Gao Chun-ping, Li Zhong-xue, “Optimization of project payment schedules with
Nash equilibrium model and genetic algorithm”, Journal of Chongqing University, Eng Ed
(ISSN 1671-8224), vol. 6, no. 2, pp.107–112, 2007.
[5] Bao Ngoc Trinh, Quyet Thang Huynh, Thuy Linh Nguyen, “Research on Genetic Algorithm
and Nash Equilibrium in Multi-Round Procurement,” volume 297: New Trends in Intelligent
Software Methodologies, Tools and Techniques, pp. 51-64, 2017. Doi:10.3233/978-1-61499-800-
6-51
[6] Bao Ngoc Trinh, Quyet Thang Huynh, Duc Hung Bui, Tuan Dung Le, “Modeling and developing
project payment schedule algorithm using genetic algorithm and Nash Equilibrium,” Journal
of Science and Technology, ISSN 2354-1083, vol. 113, no. C, pp.137–143, 2016.
[7] Vijay K. Verma, The Human Aspects of Project Management - Managing the Project Team,
Volume Three, Project Management Institute, ISBN: 1880410427, 1997.
184 BAO NGOC TRINH, QUYET THANG HUYNH, XUAN THANG NGUYEN
[8] Guan, D, Conflicts in the project environment, Paper presented at PMI Global Con-
gress 2007Asia Pacific, Hong Kong, People’s Republic of China. Newtown Square, PA:
Project Management Institute, 2007. Available: https://www.pmi.org/learning/library/
project-environment-eleven-project-conflicts-7348 [Accessed: 22 - May - 2019]
[9] Dario Bauso, “Game Theory: Models, numerical methods and applications,” Foundations and
Trends R in Systems and Control, vol. 1, no. 4, pp. 379–522, 2014. Doi: 10.1561/2600000003
[10] Bao Ngoc Trinh, Quyet Thang Huynh, Xuan Thang Nguyen, Van Quyen Ngo, Thanh Trung
Vu, “Application of Nash Equilibrium based approach in solving the risk responses conflicts,”
Journal of Science and Technology (JST) - Le Quy Don Technical University - No. 193 (10-
2018), Section on Information and Communication Technology number 12 (10-2018), pages
17-31, ISSN 1859-0209.
Received on September 13, 2018
Revised on March 10, 2019
